simplistic resolutions of complex conditions, The Mechanics of Virtue, Matt Berry, aphorism 172
172
Diverse human projectors superimpose a singular image upon the screen of consciousness: a concept. What is important here is the suggestion that singular concepts such as “Good” and “Evil” – like all moral concepts – are simplistic resolutions of complex conditions. In a different metaphor, a concept is a behavioral intersection of diverse mechanical forces. If, out of the need for simple presentation, I trace the line of one mechanical force, I might next contradict myself with another equally legitimate mechanical description. Thus, herding, dominance, aggression, habituation, territory, and the like, are not presented as if in a debate, where one is held up as evidence refuting another ... but all as separate avenues leading toward a singular concept, such as “Evil.” For example, Evil is breaking with one’s herd, with the herd's habits, with one’s rank. But breaking with a social habit is breaking with rank ... and breaking with rank is breaking with habit and herd. We appear to be dancing around one totem pole ... one ineffable stuff that requires multiple approaches in description for the fact that we can only see its results in overly simplistic “concepts.” We raise an eyebrow to conceptual relationships and begin tracing lines of behavioral forces. Likewise, we reject the ineffable ... the useless and map out as best we can the multiple avenues toward those intersections we blithely call, concepts.
Diverse human projectors superimpose a singular image upon the screen of consciousness: a concept. What is important here is the suggestion that singular concepts such as “Good” and “Evil” – like all moral concepts – are simplistic resolutions of complex conditions. In a different metaphor, a concept is a behavioral intersection of diverse mechanical forces. If, out of the need for simple presentation, I trace the line of one mechanical force, I might next contradict myself with another equally legitimate mechanical description. Thus, herding, dominance, aggression, habituation, territory, and the like, are not presented as if in a debate, where one is held up as evidence refuting another ... but all as separate avenues leading toward a singular concept, such as “Evil.” For example, Evil is breaking with one’s herd, with the herd's habits, with one’s rank. But breaking with a social habit is breaking with rank ... and breaking with rank is breaking with habit and herd. We appear to be dancing around one totem pole ... one ineffable stuff that requires multiple approaches in description for the fact that we can only see its results in overly simplistic “concepts.” We raise an eyebrow to conceptual relationships and begin tracing lines of behavioral forces. Likewise, we reject the ineffable ... the useless and map out as best we can the multiple avenues toward those intersections we blithely call, concepts.